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Sections of this paper which summarize the actual workings
of the RAND Strategy Assessment System (RSAS) are based, in part,
upon both published and unpublished papers produced by individ-
uals working at the RAND Corporation in the RAND Strategy Assess-
ment Center. The authors are grateful to Michael Rich, Vice
President for National Security Research, Dr. Paul K. Davis, the
Principal Investigator for "Improved Methods for Strategic
Analysis," Dr. Bruce W. Bennett, Dr. William L. Schwabe, Dr. John
Y. Schrader, Mark Hoyer, and Arthur Bullock, all of the RAND
Corporation, for their continuing support of the RSAS at the
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). The authors are also most
appreciative of the support and assistance provided by Andrew
Marshall, Director of Net Assessment, in the Office of the Secre-
tary of Defense (OSD/NA), and members of his staff; Captain Kurt
Juroff, OP-654, the RSAS sponsor in OPNAV; Alan Jones, Technical
Director of the Wargaming Analysis and Research Lab at NPS, and
his staff for hardware and technical support; the NPS Research
Council who provided a grant to sponsor the initial RSAS in-
stallation; and to Lieutenant Commander's Bob Ross and Ned Smith
of the Defense Nuclear Agency for sponsoring RSAS research work
and this technical report. This version of the study is an update
of the original technical report, NPS-56-88-010, published in
March 1988, re-written to satisfy the requirements of a DNA
sponsored research project "Nuclear Assessments". The sponsor has
the option of continuing to fund NPS RSAS activities or setting
up a system at HQ DNA.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report describes the RAND Strategy Assessment System
(RSAS) installation at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). The
NPS RSAS first became operational in September 1987, and has
continued to expand and improve as expertise is gained and the
naval models are enhanced. The RSAS is a product of a multiyear
effort by the RAND Corporation ("Improved Methods for Strategic
Analysis") under the sponsorship of the Director, Net Assessment,
in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD/NA). The RSAS
attempts to combine the best features of political-military war-
gaming and analytic modeling. The RSAS is extremely flexible: it
can be run in a near automatic mode with essentially two expert
systems playing against each other, or it can be run as an inter-
active game with all the moves controlled by human players. In
between these extremes, the RSAS can be used as an analytic tool
to support strategy research and instruction, and as a wargaming
support system.
Major models in the RSAS include Blue, Red, and Green agents
playing the various nations, the Force Agent for simulating
military operations, and the Control Agent that allows the
analyst to control specific events, the scenario, timing, etc..
National Command Level models conduct high level decision-making,
and Analytic War Plans carry out military operations for each
side. The RSAS can currently conduct runs emphasizing strategic
nuclear combat, Central European theater warfare, naval warfare
to a certain degree, and air-land engagements in other "alter-
nate" theaters. The current naval models have evolved to the
point where essential surface and strike warfare, ASW, and mining
can be simulated; however, improvements in the naval models are
required, as are additional models for the other aspects of naval
warfare.
The software installation at NPS is RSAS release 3.5, run-
ning on two networked Sun micro workstations with a server, large
hard-disk, tape drive, and printers in support. Secure space and
housekeeping facilities are provided by the NPS Wargaming
Analysis and Research Lab (WARLAB) of the Operations Research
Department. RSAS and UNIX operating expertise is provided by the
National Security Affairs Department. Future enhancements re-
quired for the system include an additional workstation, backup
hard disks, an improved power supply, and a large screen display
for instruction, briefing, and game purposes. Primary RSAS use
at NPS is in support of research sponsored by those organizations
that have funded the installation. Thus far the RSAS has been
used to support student thesis research, classroom instruction,
NSA faculty research, and some basic wargaming.
RSAS models are not yet completely developed to the satis-
faction of Navy users. Rather than precluding future support of
the RSAS, the Navy should continue to encourage development of
maritime models and the attainment of in-house expertise in the
use of the system. When fully operational, the RSAS will be a
unique system that will aid Navy analysts and decision-makers
who, for the first time, will have models that can represent
most levels and locations of the political and military dimen-
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The RAND Strategy Assessment System (RSAS) was developed by
the RAND Corporation under a project entitled "Improved Methods
for Strategic Analysis." The work is sponsored by the Director,
Net Assessment, in the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD/NA) in cooperation with the Office of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff (OJCS), each of the Service Deputy Chiefs for Plans,
Policy, and Operations, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),
National Security Agency (NSA), and Defense Intelligence Agency
(DIA). Representatives of these organizations make up the RSAS
Steering Group.
Current holders of the RSAS include OSD/NA, OSD Program
Analysis & Evaluation (OSD/PA&E), the Force Structure, Resource &
Assessment Directorate of the Joint Staff (J-8), the Strategic
Plans & Policy Directorate of the Joint Staff (J-5), the CIA
Office of Soviet Affairs (SOVA), the Army Concepts Analysis
Agency (CAA), the National Defense University War Gaming and
Simulation Center (NDU-WGSC), the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS)
National Security Affairs Department, the Naval War College
Center for Wargaming, the Air University Center for Aerospace
Doctrine Research & Education/Wargaming & Technical Analysis
Division ( AU/CADRE /WGTA ) , the U.S. Commander in Chief Pacific
(USPACOM) J-55, the Army War College, DIA, and NSA. Organizations
preparing to acquire the RSAS include the U.S. European Command
(EUCOM), Air Force/XO, and the Army Intelligence Technical
Analysis Center (ITAC). Additional users may be authorized by the
RSAS Steering Group at a later time.
Essentially a complex political-military simulation, the
RSAS will eventually have the capability to handle all forms and
phases of warfare, including intelligence and logistics, in a
highly aggregated fashion. This will include the ability to play
crises short of war, extended conventional war, nuclear war,
conventional actions after nuclear strikes, war in space, war at
sea, and all supporting political actions that supplement the
armed conflict portion of war. The models are intentionally
deterministic; hence plays may be repeated with the analyst
making the choice of variables to be modified in order to do
sensitivity analysis. Decisions are automatically logged accord-
ing to analytic requirements.
NPS was selected to be the recipient of the Navy's first
RSAS as a result of a meeting of the RSAS Steering Group in Santa
Monica, California on 24-25 March 1986. This decision was record-
ed in a memorandum from the Director of Net Assessment/OSD, dated
12 May 1986, reporting the results of the conference. The initial
hardware was obtained by NPS using $43,227 in 1987 NPS labora-
tory package resources to upgrade a Sun workstation on loan from
the Naval Ocean Systems Center (NOSC) to the NPS Wargaming
Analysis & Research Laboratory (WARLAB) . The RSAS software,
valued at some $31M, was provided by the Rand Corporation as
authorized by the RSAS Steering Group. Other support for re-
search has been provided for by $230,000 in Navy Direct Research
Funding, and by $150,000 from the Defense Nuclear Agency research
funding. The initial hardware has been upgraded and improved.
There are now two dedicated workstations, a file server, and a
color printer in addition to the original large hard disk, high
density tape unit, and laser printer, all networked together.
This report will provide a brief overview of the RSAS struc-
ture, the capabilities found in strategic nuclear, European and
other land theater, and the naval models; how the RSAS is organ-
ized at NPS; and the opportunities for research. The appendices
include a more detailed description of the hardware and software,
the standard operating procedures for RSAS employment at NPS,
specific restrictions due to security of the models and the
database, and agreements with appropriate departments at NPS
regarding maintenance and security. These appendices should be of
interest to other authorized users when attempting to set up
their own system.
The Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) provided funds for this
report. DNA can continue to fund the RSAS at NPS for research on
subjects of interest to both the NPS and DNA or, alternatively,
the DNA can purchase its own hardware, request delivery of the
RSAS software through the RSAS Steering Group, obtain the neces-




1. Methodology . The RSAS is the product of a multiyear effort
which is attempting to improve the ability of strategy analysts
by combining the best features of political-military wargaming
and analytic modeling. This approach presents certain difficul-
ties since war games usually address the asymmetries in conflict,
the roles of non- superpowers, the nuclear forces, and the opera-
tional constraints, etc. Modeling, in contrast, tends to be more
rigorous, and more inclined to a "what if?" type of approach.
There are two important components in the RSAS approach: The use
of decision models, and the procedures for analytic modeling.
The use of decision models to replace some or even all of
the human decision making involved in game play both speeds play
and requires a rigorous approach to the decisions being made. It
also insures that the same decisions are always made for a given
set of circumstances. Analysts and game players can still play
all or part of the time, depending upon the requirements of the
situation, by changing variables.
The second important component, the procedures for modeling
the actual warfare, is embodied in the system of models called
CAMPAIGN. CAMPAIGN is essentially the force agent for the RSAS,
evaluating force operations and adjudicating combat. It uses a
relatively high level of aggregation for forces, geography, and
targets, reflects increasingly higher asymmetries in terminology
and operational concepts between Red and Blue, and captures
parametrically some of the more complex military operations, such
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as mobile missiles and communications sabotage. CAMPAIGN allows
the user to set most major parameters into the simulation such as
the yield of a nuclear weapon, or to script the results of "off-
line" analysis such as the impact of chemical attacks on aircraft
sortie rates.
In addition to permitting rapid testing of various scenarios
and alternatives, the fast RSAS run time permits a "lookahead" in
which the player or analyst can run a game within a game to test
a plan using the entire gaming system to play against perceptions
of the opponent. The "lookahead" tests the feasibility and accep-
tability of a specific plan, although the results may differ from
subseguent runs due to misperceptions about the opponent or that
the opponent simply chooses another alternative.
2. Models in the RSAS . Access to the RSAS is controlled by a
government steering group. An unclassified version does not exist
primarily because the system depends upon many sensitive data-
bases. The major political agents in the RSAS are the Blue, Red,
and Green representing NATO, the Warsaw Treaty Organization, and
other countries, respectively. The Force Agent (CAMPAIGN), tracks
military forces worldwide and assesses the results of force
operations and battles. The third major agent is the Control
Agent which assists the analyst in writing information displays,
changing parameters, introducing exogenous events, and speci-
fying the key events of a desired scenario. Each of these major
agents and models is covered in detail below.
a. Red and Blue Agents . RSAS command, control and communi-
3
cation (C ) models have been developed that represent the actual
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3
organization and operation of NATO/U.S. and WTO/USSR C func-
2
tions. Command and Control (C ) of forces is generally displayed
in normal wartime position, i.e., there are generally no separate
2
peacetime and wartime C organizations. The functions of chang-
2 2
ing operational control from peacetime C to wartime C , however,
are generally accounted for within the RSAS. Thus, U.S. naval
2
forces may be under the C of NATO's Supreme Commander-Atlantic
(SACLANT) for display purposes, but additional tableaus may show
2
these forces as not available. Although such C depiction is not
absolutely correct, the emphasis on wartime functions for the
RSAS did not warrant the additional expense and computer memory
2
needed to depict correctly C in both peacetime and war. Gener-
ally, the names used for NATO/U.S. Commanders-in-Chief (CINC's)
correspond to reality, although a general command for forces in
the continental U.S. was used instead of the multiple commands
that actually exist. Actual CINC boundaries were also used.
For WTO/USSR theaters of military operations (TVD) commands,
the best available data for names/boundaries are used, recogniz-
ing that in wartime these strategic directions will not necessar-
ily follow pre-war expectations. Communications models used are
classified and as accurate as possible, given the level of
classification of the system. The RSAS architecture allows for
3
more accurate portrayal of C , if required, to include data at
extremely high levels of classification.
The Red and Blue agents for the RSAS each have a high level
model termed the National Command Level (NCL) that emulates the
highest authority for each agent - the National Command Authority
12
(NCA) for Blue, and the Defense Council for Red. The NCL selects
escalation guidance, objectives, and strategies for each theater
based upon the type of NCL selected by the analyst and a series
of rules assessing the various NCL parameters to include the
threat, the type and rapidity of decisionmaking, the status of
superpower relations, etc. There are currently two different Red
and two different Blue agents available in the RSAS; one set
being more "hawkish" than the other.
A Global Command Authority (GCL) that represents the U.S./
NATO Joint Chiefs of Staff and NATO Military Committee, and the
Soviet General Staff (VGK) then implements these decisions into
specific plans to be run. The NCL models selected by the analyst
can be modified or can be run on an automated basis. They can be
used to run the game or can be studied as part of the research
into national decision-making procedures.
b. Green Agent . The Green Agent is the RSAS model of non-
superpower states which simulates national behavior in periods of
superpower crises and open warfare. Countries modeled include the
non-Soviet Warsaw Pact states, all NATO countries other than the
U.S., as well as Japan, China, and numerous others. Green Agent
is a rule based model which tests various conditions and takes
actions based upon the rules of the system. Variables for each
country include such items as alliance, orientation, temperament,
assertiveness, opportunism, and nuclear capability. These
variables can be set at the start of the game or changed during
the game run. Outputs include a set of decisions or postures
which control the actions of the armed forces of the country and
access to its territory.
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c. Control Agent . The Control Agent allows the analyst to
schedule the writing out of information displays, to change
selected parameters, to introduce exogenous events such as un-
conventional warfare, and to specify key events in the scenario,
as required. The analyst can specify, for example, the day when
nuclear warfare is to start, the loss of command posts to special
forces action at specified times, and the degree of logging
detail desired. The Control agent is extremely useful in adapting
game play to the analytic or research requirements at hand. The
Control Agent uses a System Monitor polling the decision models
and a series of wakeup rules that are created when the analyst
selects the various inputs noted above.
d. CAMPAIGN . CAMPAIGN is the global combat model providing a
fully integrated treatment of conventional, theater-nuclear, and
intercontinental nuclear warfare on a worldwide scale. CAMPAIGN
is, in turn, part of the larger system that provides national
level political models that deal with such issues as grand
strategy, escalation, and war termination. CAMPAIGN, also refer-
red to as the Force Agent, includes two models of operations: the
main theater model (CAMPAIGN-MT) for Central Europe and Korea,
and the alternate theater model (CAMPAIGN-ALT) for Northern and
Southern Europe, Southwest Asia, with some initial work in other
areas. CAMPAIGN is a time stepped model in which the length of
the steps (one hour or less, up to 24 hours) are determined by
the world situation, and by various wake up rules set by the
players or by the system decision models. Most of CAMPAIGN-MT is
run in a "C" language program called "Camper" which can also be
14
run in a stand-alone mode. In contrast, CAMPAIGN-ALT is written
in RAND-ABEL. The heart of CAMPAIGN-MT is a collection of theater
warfare, naval warfare, strategic warfare, and supporting models.
These warfare models, usually developed separately to control
complexity, contain significant interactions, sometimes using
the same submodel for multiple purposes, e.g., dispersal of
aircraft. Also, some model substitution can take place, e.g.,
RAND's TacSage for the normal air battle model. CAMPAIGN-MT is
used for Central Europe and Korea, while the CAMPAIGN-ALT models
are used for Northern and Southern Europe, the Middle East,
Southwest Asia, and other areas under development. The RSAS
database, the World Situation Data Set (WSDS), is divided into
WSDS-A which supports CAMPAIGN-ALT, and WSDS-C which supports
CAMPAIGN-MT.
3. Analytic War Plans . Blue analytic war plans (AWP's) are based
upon the same base year as the databases (currently 1985). War
plans do not derive from strategies used to support programming
but rather from strategies based upon forces in hand. Historical
files were used to create AWP's for earlier years. AWP archi-
tecture should support entering a wide variety of future or
alternative current plans, and the architecture is generally
compatible with that in current use by major CINC's. Red AWP's
were developed using the best information available from national
intelligence sources. Where alternative strategies are possible,
a default strategy is provided, and in some cases alternative
strategies (AWP's) can be selected. Should an analyst desire to
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modify AWP's to reflect additional alternative strategies, pro-
cedures exist to exercise this option.
The AWP's in the RSAS are written in RAND-ABEL code, are
relatively easy to read, and can be modified, although implemen-
tation of such modifications is not trivial. The AWP's are cons-
tructed in a modular fashion, using a phase, move, and order
structure, together with bounds and wakeup rules for the various
commands. AWP's can be controlled by the use of the Data Editor
tableaux, although care must be taken with regard to changing the
variables. AWP's receive authorizations to carry out actions from
several sources including the NCL's or an analyst developed
control plan, and produce as outputs orders to the force models,
notification to higher authority, and announcements to the Green
Agent.
4. Database and Software Tools . Database type information is
contained in the notional World Situation Data Set (WSDS), con-
taining entries in both RAND-ABEL (WSDS-A) and in the "C" pro-
gramming language (WSDS-C) . WSDS-A supports the Red, Blue, and
Green Agent decision models, and CAMPAIGN-ALT. WSDS-C supports
CAMPAIGN-MT. The analyst can interface with the system through
the Control Panel, the Data Editor, the Hierarchy Tool, the
Graphics Tools, CAMPAIGN Menu Tool (CMENT), the Logging Tools,
and the Interpreter. These interfaces can be used to set and
change inputs before and during the game, can be used to call and
analyze data at any point during or after the game, and can be
used to study in detail the logic and responses of the various
models following each game.
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Five of the software tools merit special mention:
a. Data Editor: The primary means of viewing and changing
the many variables in the RSAS. It is used to set the initial
values and game parameters, follow the game, alter the parameters
during the game, perform post game analysis, and generate
reports. Most commonly it is used to generate scenarios to
include AWP selection, event timing, and exogenous event schedul-
ing. It is made up of various Tableaux that can be selected and
modified.
b. Cross Referencing Tool: For using or building rule based
decision models. It can provide allowed values for variables,
their locations, and comments regarding them.
c. Hierarchy Tool: Displays the RSAS hierarchy, depicting
which entity is active at any given time during the game. Permits
the game to be stopped when a particular entity is active, and
can permit rules to be displayed regarding a selected actor.
Useful for displaying the current command structure while the
game is running, and indicating the active AWP for each command.
d. CAMPAIGN Menu Tool (CMENT): Interface into Force-C or
CAMPER, providing more rapid access via walking menus, sliding
table variables and a rolling ball globe for worldwide displays.
CMENT is of major value in executing force orders, displaying
force status, showing results of engagements, and depicting
details of force interactions.
e. Interpreter: For changing and debugging RAND-ABEL codes
interactively
.
Analyst developed control plans have emerged as an important
method for analysts to exercise control over the Force models.
17
Use of the control plans and the "INT" directory, as well as the
"use" files, for Force orders allows great flexibility in RSAS
support for specialized studies.
5. Computer Factors . The standard configuration for RSAS is the
Sun Microsystem Sun Three color workstation operating under Sun's
version of Berkeley UNIX, and using the "C" programming language.
RSAS 3.5 requires at least 12 megabytes of workstation memory,
and a minimum of 300 megabytes of disk space. Note that the files
required by the system and the RSAS alone take up nearly 200
megabytes of storage. RSAS 3.5 has some 686,000 lines of source
code (including 260,000 lines devoted to RAND-ABEL, and 180,000
to CAMPAIGN), and 120,000 lines of other support code, for a
total of 806,000 lines of code. Typical scenario execution times
include about one hour for twenty days of global war, and about
forty minutes for twenty days of war in Europe. While the RSAS is
currently programmed to run on the Sun workstations, it could be
reprogrammed to work on other systems. The feasibility of other
workstation options has been approved by the RSAS Steering group;
however, recent studies indicate that cost considerations pre-
clude a VAX/VMS modification, unless the potential user is
willing to provide funds for such an extensive project.
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Part III
STRATEGIC NUCLEAR AND RELATED MODELS
1. Strategic vs Theater . CAMPAIGN provides extensive "strategic"
nuclear models for targeting, command, control, communications,
3
and intelligence (C I), force operations, and battle damage
assessment (BDA). These models are integrated into the overall
CAMPAIGN structure, thus, "strategic" nuclear forces may be used
in the theater campaign and may be damaged by the theater nuclear
or the conventional campaign. "Strategic" and theater nuclear
models share the same BDA models. For ease in communicating to
Western readers, the more familiar use of the term "strategic"
will be used in this report; i.e., intercontinental nuclear
forces that are generally addressed in "strategic" arms control
agreements. The reader is cautioned that this concept of
"strategic" is not shared by the Soviet Union nor the Red agent
in the RSAS.
2. Nuclear Forces . Nuclear capable forces can be used for stra-
tegic, operational, or tactical nuclear missions in any theater
of warfare. Within CAMPAIGN, strategic nuclear missions are cur-
rently carried out by heavy bombers, land-based (ICBM) and sub-
marine-launched (SLBM) ballistic missiles. British, French, and
Chinese strategic forces, U.S. and Soviet mid-range missiles, and
most nuclear capable aircraft other than heavy bombers are
employed primarily for theater missions. Artillery fired atomic
projectiles, very short range missiles, and nuclear aircraft
committed to battlefield support are used for nuclear battlefield
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missions. All strategic nuclear forces as well as operational
and tactical nuclear forces can be used for theater nuclear
missions. Tactical nuclear warfare at sea is an area that will
need extensive upgrading in the future to represent fully the
options available to each political-military agent.
Generally, nuclear forces are designed to execute preplanned
targeting packages to handle various warfighting options that
support the strategic, operational, or tactical objectives speci-
fied by the appropriate functional/area commanders. Strategic
force execution requires connectivity to the National Command
Authority (NCA) . Theater nuclear forces use the same detailed
3
delivery models used by the strategic forces, except that C is
not modeled explicitly and, instead, a nominal delay is inserted
keyed to the force and the country executing. At the battlefield
3
level, a simple delivery model is used with no C delays.
3. Readiness . Levels of readiness are indicated by the force
alert level, which is a fraction representing the percentage of
aircraft and missiles ready for immediate execute. A default
alert rate is assumed, but the analyst may vary these levels
3
uniformly or by force type as required. Bombers and C aircraft
can be launched for airborne alert, and are supported by cycling
and tanking. The combat readiness of SSBN forces is indicated by
the number of SSBN ' s at sea . SSBN ' s are divided into groups and
assigned to support a patrol region. The SSBN's cycle between
their port and patrol area, and are integrated in with other
naval movements in their ocean area. The number of SSBN's at sea
can be increased by increasing the alert level for the SSBN's.
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CAMPAIGN provides an automatic bomber "flush on warning" model to
increase survivability, and calculates the number of surviving
aircraft available for subsequent re-use.
4. Operations . Strategic nuclear forces can be alerted, dispers-
ed, deployed, executed and damaged. Bombers can be launched for
survival, ordered to their turn-around points, can be recovered,
and reconstituted. Nuclear forces execute "nested" plans whenever
they receive the appropriate authenticated communications (EAM's)
which are disseminated from the NCL to the functional or regional
groupings of forces. Once EAM's are received, missions are as-
signed to the individual weapons systems. In addition to the
nested plans, nuclear forces can also be issued strike orders to
execute. When launched, ICBM's and SLBM's are moved by a common
missile movement model which is based upon great circle distance
and speed with respect to the curvature of the earth. There is a
parameterized ballistic missile defense model which extracts
fixed attrition rates on incoming re-entry vehicles up to a
selectable threshold. A space-based ballistic missile defense
system is being added to the models for a future RSAS software
release.
Bombers are assigned to predefined flight paths according to
expected targeting plans, although the analyst may vary the pre-
defined plans. Bombers are assigned tankers automatically as
required, and are subjected to the simplified air defense model
that allows for a fixed attrition rate for all enemy aircraft by
region, or to a more fully developed air defense attrition model,
if available. Bombers may release cruise missiles at the appro-
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priate distances from their target, with the missiles having a
greater probability of penetration than their parent bombers. All
nuclear forces are subject to attrition during the conventional
phase of a war. Modeling of recovery and reconstitution is
limited at present. Currently, there is no provision for ICBM
silo or SSBN reloads.
3
5. Strategic Command , Control, and Communications (C J_. The cur-
3
rent nuclear C models deal primarily with the ability of the NCA
to communicate with strategic nuclear forces. Command and control
decisions are made by the decision models of the full RSAS rather
3
than by CAMPAIGN. Once a decision has been made, the C model
assesses the capability of the source command node to communicate
3
with its destinations. The output of the C model is an estimated
time for correct message receipt and the fraction of each force
connected. The model conducts a path search to find an acceptable
path to destination and calculates the delay time via the nodes
3
modeled in the C models. If either end point node is destroyed,
communications are not possible and the force ignores the order.
If the nodes are damaged, the model measures the amount of time
needed for repair. If the repair times are excessive, the trans-
mission is considered blocked, and the applicable force ignores
the order. If the source and destination nodes are operational,
the model searches for a good path, selecting the first one that
does not have an "excessive" delay. The Node Assessment Module
calculates the time required to repair any damage to the node
facilities, adds the processing time for a message, and also adds
formatting time, message verification time, and force execution
22
time. The Link Assessment Module determines if the two nodes can
communicate, and how much delay might be involved due to jamming
and/or scintillation. The various alternative command posts and
communications aircraft are modeled in RSAS and can become pos-
sible nodes in the network. Sustainability is also modeled,
considering refueling, maintenance, and home base damage. Warning
is partially modeled for strategic forces.
Space detection of missile launch is modeled as are certain
communications paths. Tactical warning in CAMPAIGN serves to
flush alerted aircraft and to advise the NCA. Strategic warning
is specifically addressed by various political and military sig-
nals given by the Red, Blue, and Green agents.
6. Targeting . There are 124 distinct classes of targets in
CAMPAIGN, referring not only to types of fixed facilities but
also to more dynamic targets such as mobile missiles, aircraft,
or troop formations. Damage from nuclear and conventional weapons
is inflicted by attacking a CAMPAIGN target class and subclass
within a given region. Strategic forces are targeted by assigning
them to targeting plans, of which there are four types: a SIOP-
like strategic nested attack plan (SNAP), theater strike plans,
ad hoc plans, and strategic reserve. Weapons can be moved from
one type of plan to another. Communications facilities, while
identified as individual nodes, cannot be targeted directly. They
must be targeted as a target class in a given region. Note that
sabotage may be directed against an individual site using the
"initiate" order.
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7. Damage Assessment . CAMPAIGN uses a generalized battle damage
assessment methodology for all conventional and nuclear weapons,
modeling only blast damage. Targets sensitive to other means of
3
damage must be converted to blast damage equivalent. C facili-
ties may be damaged by electromagnetic pulse and scripted (off-
line) sabotage, while degradation from scintillation and jamming,
can also be represented. The damage assessment model assumes that
all attacks against a target class and region are distributed
uniformly over these targets in the region. The attacker is not
allowed bomb damage assessment or "empty hole" information.
8. Inputs and Outputs . The nuclear models draw their input from a
wide range of sources including the basic RSAS input files for a
description of the nuclear forces, the communications data files
3
for C location and connectivity, facility files for target data,
weapon data and inventory from the weapons files, the information
needed to build nested target options from the target file, the
various parameter settings, and the model options to specify the
models to be used in the current run. The user may then further
modify the the models by designating an AWP, by issuing separate
orders, changing setable parameters, or using the "use" option.
Outputs include tabular displays such as damage summaries and
force status, graphic displays such as a target summary and time-
line charts, and output files.
9. The Retargeter . This interface with CAMPAIGN includes an upper
level in which the nuclear plan in question is presented in the
form of nested boxes, and a lower level in which a spreadsheet is
used for detailed selection of weapons. The boxes can be changed,
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modifying the nested subplans. An intermediate display permits
the selection of weapons and target regions, and a final spread-
sheet depicts weapons versus target regions. Weapons can be
targeted against specific areas, with the changes subsequently
sent to the CAMPAIGN models.
10. Parameters . There are several parameters in the nuclear
models that can be adjusted and or selected according to the
needs of the analyst. Major nuclear models include some twenty
parameters that permit variable adjustment such as psi hardness
of aircraft shelters, weapon CEP's, system mobilization rates,
etc.. There are also model setting parameters such as selection
of the nested plan and the bomber penetration model. These para-
meters have default values, and can be called from the Force/
CMENT window for a display of maximum/minimum/default values and
a brief explanation of the parameter. Values can be accessed and




CENTRAL EUROPEAN THEATER (CAMPAIGN-MT) MODEL
1. Introduction . Theater warfare modeling is probably the best
developed aspect of the RSAS. The model has concentrated on the
land/air war on the central front, with global escalatory, naval,
and strategic nuclear force operations. Logistics support that
could impact on the central front is to be improved later. The
result is a reasonably reliable model of the central front, but
an incomplete global model that needs to represent accurately
these potentially significant contributions. Without these full
capabilities to model areas outside of the European theater, the
RSAS will be incapable of performing the types of simulations
that are envisaged by the Navy.
2. Organization . The model follows Red divisions and Blue
brigades along axes of advance/defense as specified in the
analytic war plans (AWP's) using a roughly rectangular grid base
superimposed upon the geographic features of central Europe. The
simulation/model emphasizes the overall Red or Blue theater com-
mander's perspective rather than that of the division or corps/
army commander. The model tracks unit characteristics in some
detail to include nationality, cohesiveness, composition, and
level of training. The user can vary assumptions about a fairly
broad range of issues to include national fighting effectiveness,
maximum combat intensity, exchange ratios from prepared defenses,
the effectiveness of close air support and helicopters in impos-
ing attrition, and the delay, defense and attacker strategies.
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3. Maneuver . The model allows the attacker and defender to
maneuver at the corps/army level or higher. Axes for main
thrusts, holding actions, follow-on attacks, and flank protection
are all possible. There is also provision for the attacker to
conduct a strategic level envelopment/encirclement (Red's pre-
ferred offensive), and for the defender to mount counter-
offensives. The model uses phases of battle to include prepara-
tion, assault, breakthrough, exploitation and pursuit. Break-
throughs, large local one-time losses, and operational maneuver
groups in the defender's rear area may all be represented. One
of the major strengths of the system is that Blue players are
forced to confront a Red who engages not only in parallel
opposing "pistons" but also with an envelopment/encirclement
method of advance.
4. Air War . With regard to the air war, the model conducts opera-
tions for Blue sguadrons and Red air regiments, handling sortie
generation, mission planning, air-to-air combat, interdiction,
and air-ground interactions to include close air support and
battlefield interdiction. Air power can be used to defeat an
operational maneuver group during the period of initial inser-
tion. Carrier-based naval aviation can be used by the theater
commander to supplement land-based tactical air assets in all
normal air warfare missions.
5. Logistics . Logistics is played at a high level of aggregation
by tracking days of supplies by nationality and permitting
optional sharing of supplies. Movement of supplies is simulated
27
crudely, with each geographic zone having its own lines of com-
munication trafficability and vulnerability. Movement through the
zone can be reduced by interdiction. Strategic mobility deals
with combat forces and support packages separately. Sea lines of
communication are not currently fully modeled, making the
logistical sustainability issue a major current problem area.
6. Naval War . The current model does not adequately perform
amphibious landings, combined arms amphibious/airborne assault,
defense against seaborne invasion, inshore mine warfare, or an
accurate representation of the battle for the sea lines of com-
munication. These deficiencies will need to be corrected before
the RSAS can perform all the simulations of Navy interest. When
the RSAS is fully developed, analysts will have a new opportunity
to study the cross influences of war at sea to warfare ashore.
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Part V
NAVAL WARFARE AND SUGGESTED IMPROVEMENTS
1. Naval Warfare . The naval combat models in RSAS conduct naval
force simulations including antisubmarine warfare (ASW), anti-
surface warfare (ASuW), and anti-air warfare (AAW) operations,
attacks on land targets by carrier-based aviation and cruise
missiles , battle group defense, at-sea engagements, shore-based
strikes against battle groups, and limited mine warfare. Sealift
is handled separately as part of the overall logistics effort.
Coastal and amphibious warfare are modeled in part in CAMPAIGN-
ALT, but are not well integrated with the major naval models.
Individual ships are represented in the naval models, but opera-
tions are conducted and battle damage assessment (BDA) accomp-
lished at the task group level. Naval engagements are conducted
in accordance with rules of engagement (ROE's) prepared for Blue,
Red, and Green. Combat results vary according to the forces
present, the region and/or choke point. ASW includes the employ-
ment of submarines, maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) , and surface
ships, with emphasis on operations against nuclear powered
submarines.
The naval models have been greatly improved in the past
year, and are still undergoing refinement. Problems still remain,
however, particularly with regard to the integration of the war
at sea with warfare ashore. The models currently do not permit a
full representation of battles over sea lines of communication,
integrated air defense issues have not been settled, amphibious
warfare is only partially played, logistics are not played at all
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at sea, and naval command and control is not well represented.
Sea-based aviation, ASW mines, ASW nuclear weapons, space assets,
and operations by diesel submarines all need to be improved
and/or added.
2. Location and Movement Ocean areas in the RSAS are divided
into 32 ocean regions, and 32 ocean subregions/chokepoints. Naval
units are assigned to these ocean region/subregions unless they
are in port, in which case they are assigned to a land region,
thus allowing a distinction between attacks on maritime assets on
the high seas and those in port or in internal waters. Naval
forces may also be assigned by exception to a specific lat/long
position; however, in most cases, units are actually assigned to
the centroid of the ocean region, presenting location and move-
ment problems, particularly if the region is large.
Naval units located in port are in varying stages of readi-
ness, measured in the number of days delay imposed prior to
getting underway. The delay can be reduced by ordering an alert,
or by ordering a deployment. Submarine groups are generally
deployed by assigning a station or launch location, and the
submarine group will deploy the boats necessary to maintain the
position. Other units are normally deployed by ordering the
flagship to move. Routes for naval forces consist of paths from
ports to operating regions. The RSAS chooses the most direct
feasible route unless specifically instructed to use intermediate
regions.
In the database, each ship is assigned to a class, with all
ships in a class having the same general characteristics. Data
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records are maintained for each ship, to include weapons capaci-
ty, ASW capability, sustainability data, and special weapons
inventories.
3. Organization . Individual ships are assigned to task groups
headed by a designated flagship. The task groups are subordinated
to task forces and fleet commanders. The task group is the basic
element for naval forces, and is named to signify its primary
mission, e.g., carrier group, anti-carrier warfare group, convoy,
etc.. Naval forces can be displayed in tabular form by individual
ship or task group, by listing all forces assigned to an ocean
region/chokepoint, or by listing forces assigned to a specific
mission activity. Nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines
are treated as strategic missile forces, and were described
previously with the strategic models.
4. Deployment . Naval forces are organized and deployed in a mid-
1985 force structure with Blue and Red strategies for employment
paralleling those expected for the U.S. /NATO and the Soviet
Union/Warsaw Pact. The initial deployment of Blue forces is
intended to be consistent with U.S. /NATO maritime strategy.
Initial Red employment emphasizes "bastion" defense. Green naval
forces are deployed and operated in accordance with expected
behavior of each individual nation. The RSAS allows the employ-
ment of forces in other possible modes; e.g., "swinging" forces
from one major command to another, convoy escort instead of
forward operations, interdiction of the sea lines of communica-
tion instead of "bastion" defense, etc..
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5. Naval Combat.
a. ASW. ASW operations in the RSAS are modeled by the inter-
action among submarines, surface task groups and maritime patrol
aircraft. Each ocean region and subregion/chokepoint is assessed
regarding the presence of submarines and ASW forces and, if
combat is authorized, capabilities versus vulnerabilities are
computed and damage calculated for each side on a periodic basis,
taking into account the general ASW related characteristics of
the region. Adjustments are made, to a certain degree, for
special sensors, diesel operations, ice conditions, and transit
speed differentials. All ASW capable ships and aircraft are
assigned capabilities relative to a baseline unit with engagement
parameters. Relative capabilities are aggregated when multiple
units are present, and attrition is distributed based upon rela-
tive vulnerabilities and current damage levels. Most parameters
can be changed by the analyst using "script" commands as deemed
necessary. Results can be displayed in several different ways:
by region, by units, or by activity.
ASW activity can be initiated by Analytic War Plans, by an
analyst-developed Control Plan, or by issuing Force orders. Force
orders can be used to deploy forces, change operating areas,
assign forces to new task groups or forces, and assign MPA to an
ocean area. Combat is controlled by assigning ROE's to each ocean
region, subregion or chokepoint to "attack, defend, withdraw,
trail, or exclude".
b. Strikes Ashore . Naval forces can be assigned strikes on
shore targets by the following methods: aircraft or missiles can
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be ordered to strike a specific target; fighters and attack
aircraft on board aircraft carriers can be assigned to launch
flights in support of a theater commander; aircraft or missiles
with nuclear weapons can be included as part of a "nested"
nuclear plan. The carriers must be within range, of course, and
sorties assigned to a theater commander will continue on a daily-
basis until unassigned or the carrier moves out of range. To
perform strikes ashore, laydown packages of targets must be
preplanned using the strike order.
c. War at Sea . Attacks on naval groups at sea may be carried
out by opposing surface or air forces using conventional or
nuclear weapons. In the model, these attacks must
.
penetrate both
an outer air defense and a close-in defense for each unit. In
addition, defensive EW draws some missiles off, while the
presence of surveillance supporting the attacking units tends to
enhance the attack effort. Missiles are aggregated across the
battle group with due regard for the effects of EW measures and
prior target identification, and hit fractions are deducted from
the total hit capacity assigned to each ship in the database.
Ship performance is degraded for each missile hit. Unfortunately,
procedures for generating these attacks are slow and cumbersome,
and must be scripted or made part of a Control or Use Plan. Some
default naval operations including shore-based air strikes
against battle groups are programmed in RSAS 3.5, but naval
plans, as well as naval command and control, need additional
refinement. Attacks by Red shore-based air can be ordered against
Blue battle groups, but, again, command and control is cumber-
some, and the algorithms are still under development.
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d. Mine Warfare . Mine warfare models place specific quanti-
ties of mines in chokepoints where they are likely to be placed,
and attrite transiting shipping depending upon the ship's track
in tne minefield and the mine density. Sweeping can be ordered,
but specific mine warfare units are not modeled.
e. Convoy Defense . Sealift convoys are attrited as they move
across sea regions where convoy attack units assigned this mis-
sion are located, and using a relatively simple ratio of attack-
ers to defenders to determine losses. Alternatively, a single
fixed loss rate can be scripted for each sea region.
6. Input, Output , Parameters . Much of the input to the naval
models comes from the database contained in the naval, ship, air,
missile, weapons, and facilities files, unfortunately not con-
solidated into one "naval " file. Both inventories and capabili-
ties are in these files as are many of the default parameters for
kill rates, adjustments, etc.. Supporting geographic and routing
data is in the database files as well. Units must, of course, be
assigned their tasks by AWP's or specific orders. Displays in-
clude tables of forces and results of combat from CMENT, maps and
graphics from the Graphics Tool, and most recently the world-wide
display of selected naval forces on the "twirling globe" graphic.
There are some 54 major naval battle parameters that can be set
or tuned as required. Due to the highly aggregated nature of the
naval models, the key parameters should be carefully examined and
set by the analyst during the analytic process.
7. Asymmetries . It is important to remember the very different
natures of the Blue and Red navies which present different
34
modeling problems. These asymmetries include the following
areas: different objectives and style of maritime warfare such as
the Red Navy's preference for sea denial and selective sea con-
trol in the maritime approaches to the homeland as opposed to the
Blue Navy preference for forward deployment and long-range power
projection; survivability in nuclear powered ballistic missile
submarines in which Blue relies upon stealth while Red relies
upon defensive "bastions"; at-sea tactical nuclear weapons capa-
bilities; peacetime naval deployment patterns; forces and con-
cepts of employment for naval aviation; command and control; the
influence of the ground forces in the thinking and employment of
navies; the differing capabilities of the allied navies; and the
use of diesel submarine forces.
The RSAS has been developed with Blue/Red asymmetries in
mind. The top down approach and the use of separate Red and Blue
models lends itself to the development of the differing approach-
es characteristic of the Red and Blue sides. The RSAS also
permits the use of special warfare phenomena that have been
difficult to model in other systems. The global scope of the RSAS
gives it a unique capability to reflect the breadth of asym-
metries , described briefly above, and the abilities of navies to
execute lateral excursions and escalation by fighting a more
extended campaign.
8. Improvements Needed . Naval models in the RSAS have been great-
ly improved in the past year; however, there are still several
areas where the models are not sufficient to meet NPS and Navy
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requirements. All of these deficiencies have been communicated
to RAND and OSD/NA. Some of the more obvious improvements needed
include:
a. Strategic nuclear strikes against the shore from naval
ballistic and cruise missile carriers from all nations that
possess or might possess such a capability, and an ability to
reload launchers where appropriate.
b. Active defense of strategic nuclear assets at sea by a
combined arms defense by all nations that might employ such a
strategy, or for all nations so that such a concept can be
analyzed.
c. The full range of all current and programmed maritime
nuclear capabilities.
d. Active attacks by all types of ASW forces, including at-
sea ASW aviation against naval ballistic and cruise missile
carriers, and attacks by the appropriate air defense forces
(including naval) against the missiles. ASW capabilities must
also be expanded to include space-based systems, communications
intercept capability, and passive listening devices.
e. Strikes against the shore by Carrier Battle Group (CVBG)
assets for all nations, full defense of the CVBG against a com-
bined arms attack, recovery of assets by the CVBG, and reattacks
against the shore targets.
f. Convoy operations in all ocean areas, including attacks
against them from a combined arms force and a full defense.
g. Improved models for strategic sealift and logistics flow
for all theaters of warfare.
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h. Improved mine warfare, including modern ASW mines, using
actual or estimated mine warfare units and inventories.
i . Amphibious warfare in areas where it is expected to occur
in major campaigns, and where analysts might wish to test its
impact; specifically against islands in the Baltic, Norwegian and
Barents Sea, along the flank areas of NATO, and in the Pacific
Far East. This should include the movement and escort of amphib-
ious units including Marine air, attack and defense of these
units and an opposed landing, if appropriate.
j . Although execution of expected maritime strategies as the
normal default is proper, options must include all other major
possible strategies: "swing," interdiction/defense of sea lines
of communication, etc.
k. Faithful representation of actual areas of responsibility
for U.S. /NATO and Soviet/Warsaw Pact Commanders-in-Chief (CINC's)
boundaries. For the classroom, it is important that actual names
and boundaries be used vice artificial creations designed to ease
modeling.
1. Major assumptions about vital strategic canals and water-
ways that are consistent with the assumptions made by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (JCS) /CINC's for planning purposes.
m. Political actions depicting activation of naval control
of shipping world-wide and potential contributions of other
nations.
n. Consideration of possible actions to be taken against
Cuba in the event of a major war in Europe.
o. Strategies for a war focused on and originating in the
Pacific. Global warfighting options must be improved.
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p. In-depth operations in the Mediterranean, Baltic, North
Sea, Norwegian Sea, Barents Sea, Sea of Japan, Sea of Okhotsk,
Bering Sea, Arctic, etc., in support of the appropriate theater
commander's objectives for each area of responsibility. These
ocean areas are the ones that need to be improved with regard to
locational capability and area ASW refinement. NPS desires to use
these theaters to assess competitive strategies for war. In-
depth bastion defense must be replicated.
q. Careful consideration of where the "sea" ends with regard
to the question of escalation and control of forces. Simply put,
naval forces that are attacked on the high seas will send a
political signal that is different than if those same forces are
attacked in territorial seas, historic/closed bays, internal
waters, etc.
r. Escalation considerations must also include the asymme-
tries in the political sensitivities of certain areas of the
world's oceans as expressed by different political actors, e.g.,
Red claims to ocean space and views on the right of access may
not be the same as Blue or Green. A proper depiction of escala-
tion with regard to maritime operations must account for opera-
tions taken in varying parts of the oceans; i.e., an attack on
maritime assets in Soviet Arctic "zonal" sectors is probably more
escalatory than an attack on that same asset in the mid-Pacific
Ocean.
s. Escalation must also represent the different values
assigned to different types of maritime assets. For example, an
attack on a civilian registered/owned ship may bring one type of
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response but an attack on a man-of-war may bring another. A
fairly sophisticated accounting needs to be created listing ship
ownership, crew, and registry so that actions taken against such
assets involve the proper political actors.
t. Representation of drilling platforms and other such mari-
time assets needs to be added to allow for attacks against these
structures . Nations are expected to respond to attacks on these
types of assets.
u. Naval BDA currently spreads fractions of damage over the
entire battle group. A more detailed assessment may prove too
expensive and self-defeating for the overall purposes of the
RSAS. Scripted battle results, however, might specify details
not actually captured in the models to lend credibility, e.g., a
carrier battle group might have its combat potential reduced in
the models as the result of an attack but the displays might
state carrier radars out of commission, flight deck damaged, etc.
In any case, defensive capability should degradate in stages, not
just all at once when a ship is sunk.
v. Although the RSAS is not a tool for tactical analysis,
the current lack of geographic coordinates for naval force strike
orders undermines credibility.
w. ROE's must vary by oceanic/land region; e.g., the rules
allowing attacks on enemy naval forces should not be the same if
the unit is on the high seas as they would be if the unit is in
port. Also, the rules may not be the same in the Pacific if the
war is thus far confined to the Atlantic.
x. Surface-to-surface warfare engagement, and command and
control improvements are needed. Surface-to-air warfare needs to
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treat fighters as something other than just long-range surface to
air missiles. Surface-to-air warfare needs to account for multi-
ple engagements of incoming aircraft or missiles (layered de-
fense). Short-range surface-to-air missile capability may be too
ambitious
.
y. Cruise missile attacks on battle groups or convoys
should not assume a uniform spread across all ships in the forma-
tion. Great efforts are made by the attacker to ensure that the
high value units are hit first, while defensive measures are
taken by the defender to protect these high value units. The
latest models attempt to cover this problem by assigning greater
effort against the key targets in the battle group while dimin-
ishing some of this effort with appropriate EW defense.
z. Timely and routine updating of databases is essential.
Names of ships and sguadrons are less important than good numbers
and locations. Adding programmed Blue forces, and projected Red
and Green forces for 1995 should come as soon as possible. The
current plan for a 1965, 1975, 1985, and 1995 database is sup-
ported, with other years to follow. The addition of CACI Products
Company as part of the effort on the database situation should
help alleviate this problem.
aa. The Navy is currently assessing the capability of large
floating offshore platforms to provide a viable alternative to
bases ashore overseas. RSAS planning should be considering model-
ing such a capability for afloat logistics and and other support
as an alternative to bases and ports.
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9. NPS Projects . NPS intends to address this lack of depth in
naval warfare by identifying the problem areas through the use of
RSAS studies and runs in support of NPS research efforts and
student seminars, and attempting to make informed recommendations
for improved algorithms and models using the extensive naval
expertise available at NPS. NPS researchers have already partici-
pated in most RSAS Working Group sessions, and have produced
studies addressing specifically the naval model problems. In
addition, NPS intends to use the RSAS to measure the impact of
the war at sea upon the war ashore, and to demonstrate where the
lack of naval models makes other forms of combat analysis fatally
flawed. The Navy and NPS need a fully developed working model
from the RAND Corporation that covers the broad spectrum of naval
warfare involving all nations around the world that have navies.
Primary emphasis should first involve strategic nuclear issues
and the conduct of war in Europe, to include the flanks, since
these models are the best developed. All other areas of the world
should be developed on a lower priority. Navy and maritime models
must be made an integral part of the strategic and European war
models, not simply just an adjunct.
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Part VI
OTHER THEATER (CAMPAIGN-ALT) MODELS
1. Organization , CAMPAIGN-ALT is a flexible model of land and air
warfare in theaters of operation outside of the NATO Central
Front in Europe, and the Korean area. The model is organized as a
network with key theater locations as nodes, and lines of com-
munication (LOC) as arcs. In some cases, a point node may not
have any LOC arcs, such as on islands. The theaters represented
in CAMPAIGN-ALT thus far include Scandinavia (Norway, Sweden, and
Finland) , the Baltic islands of Zealand and Bornholm, Greece, and
Turkey. There is a modest model representing Southwest Asia.
Iceland, Cuba, Italy, and Yugoslavia are under development. A
limited interaction with naval forces (generally scripted) is
available, although coastal forces are modeled in some detail.
CAMPAIGN-ALT depends upon the following three programs to
execute: analytic war plans (AWP's) in RAND-ABEL, a referee model
also in RAND-ABEL, and a force adjudicator or "scripter" written
in "C." AWP's provide instructions to the model regarding what
each side is supposed to accomplish under various conditions.
Ground and air forces are assigned and deployed to specific
theaters and axes of operations. Naval air may be assigned for
use, and deep operations may be ordered.
2. The CAMPAIGN-ALT War . A local ground commander module assesses
the situation as action progresses, and dispatches units accord-
ing to need. Each LOC and node have values, and the composite
theater status is determined by the status of the most important
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LOC's and nodes. Damaged targets are repaired at a fixed rate of
five per cent per day. Key and strategic events have been defined
to assist in assessing the progress of the engagements. These
include the loss of a capital, the cut-off of forces along a LOC,
and the loss of key nodes. Bases are considered closed when the
level of damage exceeds 50%.
Combat adjudication is assessed by the referee, and results
passed to the CAMPAIGN-ALT force adjudication model. Combat
results are based upon results from previous studies extrapol-
ated to fit the area being simulated. Part of this process occurs
in the referee module and part in the force adjudication model,
e.g., if air superiority has been gained by one side, this will
have an affect on the movement rate of the forward leading edge
of troops (FLOT). Seasonal modifiers built in to the modules
affect FLOT movement rates, air sorties, and loss rates in spe-
cific areas being simulated.
3. Graphics . CAMPAIGN-ALT has a series of sophisticated graphics
to support it. A map can be called up which depicts the theater,
color coded to indicate nodes and LOC's under friendly or enemy
control. Windows can be called up for the various LOC's and/or
nodes indicating their status. Forces assigned can be called by
keying on the appropriate node, LOC, or sea area.
4. Deep Operations . The referee model assesses the results of
deep operations and the impact that the operations have on the
rest of the war. Deep operations currently include airdrop, air-
reinforce, heliborne, amphibious, sea-reinforce, unconventional
warfare, and chemical strikes. Several factors are assessed in
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determining the outcome of these operations: air control, sur-
prise, and defending forces. Missions include occupy or denial
in m:st cases. Battle damage assessment is a function of mission
type and success. Types of targets include national capitals,
airfields, ports, stockpiles, key facilities, and LOC choke-
points. Each target is updated regarding the degree of enemy/
friendly control and the amount of damage sustained.
5. Improvements Needed . Future versions of CAMPAIGN-ALT should
permit representation of all seaborne and airborne forces con-
tained in the RSAS data base, permitting the analyst/player to
change the use of these unigue forces as reguired rather than
having to preset them before the start of the war. Additional
flexibility is needed in the assessment of capabilities of air-
fields, e.g., when battle damage is sustained. Also, a compact
method of addressing all relevant CAMPAIGN-ALT parameters from a
single location is planned, so that the analyst need not enter
different processes to make changes. There is no logistics repre-
sentation in the current model. CAMPAIGN-ALT should include log-
istics at least to the extent that it is played in CAMPAIGN-MT.
Amphibious warfare needs to be improved as does the inter-
face with other aspects of naval warfare. Amphibious operations
currently amount to little more than force additions to the
ground war, and the naval interface is primarily an aggregated
relation to the local coastal situation. Connections between
CAMPAIGN-ALT and the rest of the strategic portions of the RSAS
need to be improved so that all CAMPAIGN-MT events will have an
impact upon CAMPAIGN-ALT. NPS users recommend that CAMPAIGN-ALT
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not be developed to support testing minor secondary land theaters
at the expense of strategic nuclear and European theater needs,
including the missing naval components. The RSAS was originally
conceived as a global, macro- level model. Where CAMPAIGN-ALT can
be shown to be necessary to represent European flank campaigns




INSTALLATION AND USE OF RSAS AT THE NPS
1. Installation . The RSAS Sun installation in the NPS WARLAB
consists of two Sun 3/60 color microworkstations with 16 megabyte
random access memory (RAM) each, a Sun 3/180 file server with 16
megabyte RAM and a black and white monitor, a 575 megabyte hard
disk, a 1/2" high density tape unit, a color printer, and a black
and white laser printer. This equipment is in the process of
being linked together via ethernet to provide a networked system
with at least three monitors for research flexibility and for
Red/Blue/Control war gaming. Items still required include a large
screen display to support lectures and briefings, and back up
hard disk capacity. The Operations Research (OR) Department
WARLAB provides power and the electronic and physical security
for the system. The NSA Department provides administrative se-
curity, and software/hardware support. Additional details regard-
ing the installation and required enhancements are contained in
Appendix D.
2. Use of RSAS . It is anticipated that the RSAS will find mul-
tiple uses at NPS subject to the Standard Operating Procedures
(SOP) contained in Appendix A, the security restrictions and
release procedures outlined in Appendix B, and the agreements for
mutual support in Appendix C. Potential users must understand
that mastering the RSAS is a process which should be expected to
take up to four weeks of concentrated training and up to six
months of full-time hands on experience.
46
a. The National Security Affairs (NSA) Department will pro-
vide a professor who is knowledgeable about the Sun microwork-
station and the RSAS. This individual, the RSAS Administrator,
will control access to the RSAS microworkstations in accordance
with the SOP guidance provided in Appendix A and on a not-to-
interfere with sponsored research basis. The RSAS Administrator
will assign passwords, file space, give machine instruction, and
will act as primary liaison with the RAND Corporation and its
subcontractor, currently CACI Products Company, for all technical
issues.
b. Primary RSAS use, naturally, is in support of sponsored
research performed by faculty members whose research accounts
have paid for the hardware and training of personnel. All other
use of the system is on a not-to-interfere basis. It is expected
that additional faculty and staff, including faculty from depart-
ments other than National Security Affairs, will be able to use
the RSAS as a teaching aid for courses and classes in general,
and specifically for nuclear strategic planning, strategy, net
assessment, threat assessment, gaming and simulations, and intel-
ligence. When the RSAS is used to support instruction for any
curriculum, the faculty member responsible for the specific
course/class will first be given a copy of this report, then a
short orientation briefing at the Sun microworkstation, and will
be asked to determine how RSAS use would best fit the needs of
the course/class. The RSAS Administrator will then perform what-
ever runs are required (on a not-to-interfere basis) and the
results will be returned to the students in the form of a brief-
ing/presentation, to include any necessary charts and graphics.
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This would be followed by a critique, and further runs as desired
by the faculty member. It is not anticipated that any faculty/
staff members, other than those specified in sponsored research
already involving the RSAS, will be trained to operate the system
due, primarily, to the lengthy training time required to master
the system.
c. Student participation in the form of thesis projects
which will make use of the RSAS is especially encouraged. It is
not anticipated that any student will have the time to be trained
as an RSAS operator for seminar or other class papers. Students
who desire to use the RSAS for thesis research and their two
faculty advisors will first be given a copy of this report and a
short briefing/demonstration of the system. The faculty advisor
and student will then be asked to explain to the RSAS Administra-
tor what use of the system they desire. The RSAS Administrator
will perform whatever runs are required (on a not-to-interfere
basis), and the results will be returned to the student in the
form of a briefing/presentation, to include any necessary charts
and graphics. This would be followed by a critique, and further
runs as desired by the student and advisor. The student, and the
advisor at least initially, should be prepared to be present in
the WARLAB as the runs are made to assist in scoping the effort.
RSAS printouts or data runs will normally remain in the WARLAB.
If it seems necessary to remove them from the WARLAB, they will
be marked as a classified working paper, will be assigned a
control number, and will be returned to the WARLAB for
disposition.
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d. Other faculty may be able to use the RSAS for their own
research, again subject to standard restrictions, and on a not-
to-interfere basis with on-going research and use of the system
in support of instruction and thesis research. If adjudication
is necessary, the RSAS Principal Investigator will make any
necessary rulings.
e. Although the RSAS is available for student and faculty
research and instruction, and such use is encouraged, it must be
kept in mind that the information in the RSAS is SECRET/NOFORN/
WNINTEL/NO CONTRACT overall, and that these restrictions must be
carefully observed. Any reports which make use of the RSAS must
be submitted through proper channels for security review . The NSA
Department, through the RSAS Administrator, will provide advice
and guidance regarding classification and release. Additional





Opportunities to support research at NPS are as follows: any
U.S. government sponsor can provide lists of topics that it
desires students or faculty to research in the future. The
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OP-06) and the Air Force
Institute of Technology (AFIT) have already done this. Student
thesis topics are of the student's own choosing, as long as they
meet the necessary educational skill requirements, although
students are encouraged to select topics that their sponsors
desire. The obvious drawback is that NPS cannot "guarantee" that
a topic will be researched by students nor completed by a par-
ticular date.
Individual research desires and the ability to obtain spon-
sorship from DoN, DOD, or any other sources tends to complicate
the topics selected by the faculty for research. Each civilian
faculty member at NPS is normally hired for ten months. The
faculty member is expected to obtain sponsored research for the
remaining two months or take two months off without pay. The
faculty are naturally drawn into areas where a sponsor is willing
to provide resources. NSA faculty have been extremely interested
in the past in doing Navy-relevant research, but have not always
been able to find a Navy sponsor who can provide study money.
The lack of study money in OP-06 and a relatively modest
research budget within Naval Intelligence for research at NPS has
resulted in NSA faculty being drawn to research areas that lie
outside of those areas of normal interest to these two sponsors.
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When faculty research moves into one area or another , student
research in the form of theses generally follows. Put another
way, sponsored research generally results in additional student
research at no additional cost.
During FY-88, the Navy set up a new direct funding program
for all Navy research. Under this program, Navy research money
was not allowed to be sent from a Navy sponsor directly to NPS;
these funds were provided directly to the school in the budget.
The National Security Affairs (NSA) department obtained some of
this block funding and has an FY-89 research program already on-
going. No Navy sponsor had to send additional money to NPS under
this arrangement. Instead, money was provided by NPS to the
faculty member acting as Principal Investigator, if that faculty
member was able to locate a sponsor who agreed that the work
ought be done. For FY-89, the Office of the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions (OP-603) sponsored RSAS work at NPS. Since there were
more faculty members at NPS who desired access to study money,
NPS could not fund all research proposed by the faculty. Gener-
ally, those funded were those whom the sponsor not only agreed
that the work needed to be done, but also that the work was of
major importance to the Navy.
Proposals to perform Navy research under a continuation of
this direct funding program in FY-90 and beyond have been pre-
pared by NSA faculty members at time of this printing. Identi-
fying policy relevant projects to be done one year in advance is
extremely difficult. During the last cycle (FY-89), most
sponsors wanted to change the terms of reference at the last
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minute and thus marked the original proposals sent to them as no
longer of interest. Unfortunately, the net result of this was to
cancel some projects for one entire year. An NSA department
objective for the future is to find additional research sponsors
who understand the unique opportunities for RSAS and other
related research at NPS. For example, if a sponsor is interested
in seeing NPS faculty perform research using the RSAS, a general
proposal for work should be crafted with the understanding that
upon execution (1 October 19XX) , the sponsor will identify more
specifically what is to be done during the next year. This will
require that all officials in the sponsor's office understand why
proposals are written the way they are so that they are not
rejected at the last minute for being "vague."
Another vehicle to sponsor research at NPS is to transfer
funds from a non-DoN activity to NPS. A Military Interdepart-
mental Purchase Request (MIPR) can be used, for example, to
transfer money from DNA or OSD/NA to NPS. In such cases, DNA or
OSD/NA will act as the official sponsor. This vehicle is the
only way to sponsor additional research for FY-90 since all Navy
monies have been obligated. This scheme might also be the one
required if the current direct funding system is terminated in
the future. DNA is currently sponsoring research using the RSAS
at NPS for FY- 8 8 through FY-90.
Potential sponsors should contact the RSAS Principal Inves-
tigator or the RSAS Administrator (the authors of this report) at
AVN 878-2521 or (408) 646-2521 to discuss opportunities further.
There has been discussion of using the RSAS to support the Stra-
tegic Think Tank (STT) being formed by the Navy to be located at
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the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA). The terms of reference for
the STT signed out by the Vice Chief of Naval Operations on 24
November 1987 included supporting work to be performed by NPS.




Appendix A to RSAS Report
SOP FOR RSAS USE AT NPS
1. The RSAS is primarily a research and teaching tool designed
to analyze planning on the broad "strategic" level. It is not a
machine for evaluating specific weapons systems. The analyst must
be prepared to spend a considerable amount of time to set up
specific control plans, to learn enough about the system to be
able to make changes in the data base, and to modify the rules of
the various force structures. RAND estimates that mastering the
system reguires at least four weeks of concentrated training, and
up to six months of full time hands-on experience. Naval Post-
graduate School experience validates this estimate.
2. The RSAS is located in the Wargaming Analysis and Research
Laboratory (WARLAB) in Ingersoll Hall. Physical security is under
the control of the security specialist assigned to the WARLAB.
Access to the RSAS itself is under the control of the RSAS Admin-
istrator, normally the senior RSAS analyst/lab technician assist-
ing the Principal Investigator in the National Security Affairs
(NSA) Department. Individuals desiring to use the RSAS for
research, studies, thesis preparation or classroom support will
initially discuss their proposal with the RSAS Administrator, and
will be given a copy of this report for study and a short orien-
tation briefing on the RSAS. The individual will then be request-
ed to determine how RSAS use would best fit the needs of the
project under investigation, and to advise the RSAS Administrator
of the type of data and/or runs required. The RSAS Administrator
will ensure that the necessary runs are performed, and will
provide the results to the individual. The individual desiring
the RSAS runs should be prepared to be present in the WARLAB
while the runs are being performed to provide advice on the
project. Printouts and data runs from the RSAS will be marked
according to classification, and will normally remain in the
WARLAB. If it bcomes necessary to remove them from the WARLAB,
they will be marked as a classified working paper, will be
assigned a control number, and will be returned to the WARLAB for
disposition. Conflicting priorities for RSAS and operator time
that cannot be resolved will be referred to the RSAS Principal
Investigator.
3. It is not anticipated that any faculty/staff members, other
than those specified in sponsored research already involving the
RSAS or hired directly to support the RSAS as a part of the NSA
Department laboratory package, will be trained to operate the
system, due to the time involved in training and the sensitivity
of the information in the RSAS.
4. In the case of those individuals who have been, or are to be
trained on the RSAS, the RSAS System Administrator will provide
system access, checkout, and briefings as needed. Individuals
reguiring access to the RSAS must contact the WARLAB security
specialist for the proper procedures to gain entry to the WARLAB
spaces.
5. While the Sun workstations used by the RSAS are under the
control of the NSA PI, they are located in the WARLAB and must
take into account the WARLAB scheduling process, which includes
quarterly scheduling sessions, a distributed quarterly schedule,
and current changes posted in the WARLAB. The RSAS schedule is
part of this process. The RSAS Administrator will referee any
problems concerning access to the RSAS as needed, and will be
available for technical assistance as much as possible.
6. The RSAS is a SECRET NOFORN WNINTEL NO CONTRACT classified
operation, as covered in Appendix B for security and release.
Much of the information regarding intelligence and planning is
very sensitive, warranting close protection. Requests for down-
grading and declassification must be reviewed by the RSAS Ad-
ministrator prior to forwarding via the proper channels for these
purposes
.
7. Individuals working on additional new research grants and
requiring RSAS support will be expected to contribute in accord-
ance with the following guidelines:
a. pay own salary and travel;
b. pay a prorated portion of the maintenance, supplies, and
other consumables;
c. pay for any upgrades that might be required for their
project; and
d. pay a prorated portion of the RSAS Administrator or
Laboratory Technician salaries, if a significant amount of their
time is involved.
8. Use of the RSAS is highly encouraged among the faculty and
students. The Department of Defense has expended a significant
amount of funding on this project, and it represents an elaborate
system which should be used to good advantage here at the Naval
Postaraduate School.
Appendix B to RSAS Report
SECURITY AND RELEASE PROCEDURES
1. The RSAS contains information extracted from the best avail-
able intelligence, and from sensitive U.S. planning procedures.
It is essential that certain restrictions be observed with
respect to protecting the classified material contained in the
various models and data bases that are part of the system. In
accordance with guidance determined by the RSAS Steering Group
and promulgated by the Director of Net Assessment in the Office
of the Secretary of Defense, the RSAS runs at the SECRET NOFORN
WNINTEL NO CONTRACT level. Access is currently limited to U.S.
Government employees. Contractor access to the RSAS is limited to
RAND and one RAND-selected subcontractor, currently CACI Products
Company. Consultants are not exempt from these rules. Access at
NPS will not be granted automatically to any individual who has
the appropriate clearance; need to know must be established to
the RSAS Principal Investigator's satisfaction.
2. Students, faculty, and staff of the NPS using the RSAS for
research or analytical support purposes in preparing studies,
papers, theses, etc., must classify the appropriate sections.
RSAS printouts and data runs will be classified and marked
according to content, and will not be removed from the WARLAB.
If it bcomes necessary to remove them from the WARLAB, they will
be marked as a classified working paper, will be assigned a
control number, and will be returned to the WARLAB for
disposition. Studies that make use of the RSAS intended for open
publication must be submitted to the appropriate clearance
release authorities, and must be approved for release prior to
unrestricted distribution .
3. The NPS RSAS Administrator will provide advice and assistance
regarding any RSAS related material for which downgrading or
declassification authority is desired. An appropriate request
will then be made, as necessary, through the normal chain for
such matters.
4. The RSAS Administrator will maintain a list of individuals
authorized access to the RSAS, and will make the necessary ar-
rangements for access and passwords. The WARLAB provides physical
and electronic security for the RSAS. Arrangements will also be
made for an RSAS procedures guide and a use log. Individuals
making use of the RSAS will be instructed regarding security
constraints as outlined in this appendix, and in the use of the
procedures guide and the use log.
5. It must be kept in mind that the RSAS is a joint strategic net
assessment tool, and thus contains classified information that is
within the purview of all the services and intelligence agencies.
The sensitivity of the information within the system must be
observed.
Appendix C to RSAS Report
IPSA for Maintenance , Security, and Use
1. The National Security Affairs (NSA) Department, the Opera-
tions Research (OR) Department, the Director of Wargaming, and
the Wargaming Advisory Committee agree to the following pro-
cedures for the use, maintenance and security of the RSAS:
a. The recognized, prioritized list of operations which are
conducted in the Wargaming Analysis and Research Laboratory
(WARLAB) is as follows, in priority order:
(1) Classroom wargame laboratory sessions and preparation.
(2) Student and faculty research, to include resultant
thesis and report preparation.
(3) General classified word processing and computation
analysis (a recognized ancillary capability of the resident sys-
tems )
.
(4) Other DOD research and activities, to include resul-
tant report preparation.
b. The WARLAB Technical Director will manage the provision of
space on laboratory machines and floor space for peripherals to
support the operation of the RSAS as a recognized project under
category l.a.(2) above. Normal SECRET level physical and elec-
tronic security will be provided by the existing plant and secur-
ity procedures as currently published. Additional procedures for
the RSAS to meet the specialized reguirements of SECRET NOFORN
WNINTEL NO CONTRACT, as directed for the system by the RSAS
Steering Group and the Director of Net Assessment, Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD/NA), will be observed through adminis-
trative arrangements between the WARLAB Technical Director and
the NSA RSAS Administrator. This will include visitor control and
physical access to the Sun workstation.
c. The NSA Department will provide a knowledgeable professor,
normally the senior RSAS analyst, who will be designated the RSAS
Administrator. The RSAS Administrator will be trained in RSAS
matters and in Sun system administration, will give advice and
assistance on RSAS security matters, will maintain administrative
access security to the RSAS by the use of passwords and the
normal UNIX security system, and will provide indoctrination and
control for RSAS users. The RSAS Administrator will be eligible
for and authorized access for certain SCI and compartmented
clearances in order to maintain a full comprehension of all RSAS
capabilities.
d. Primary access control to the space containing the Sun
workstation which hosts the RSAS will be through scheduling
dedicated time. At other times, when dual use of the space is
required, the Sun monitors will be screened from viewing by
others in the WARLAB while the RSAS is being operated.
e. Scheduled war games for classroom instructional support on
any system in the WARLAB will take precedence over any other
activity in the WARLAB. Whenever possible, RSAS analysts will be
permitted access to the Sun workstation when such access will not
interfere with the progress of a scheduled wargame. RSAS analysts
will be cleared for at least Secret, so their presence should not
hinder the progress of any regular lab war game. Any other prior-
ity conflicts will be handled by the Technical Director and the
RSAS Administrator, with adjudication by the RSAS Principal
Investigator and the Director of Wargaming, the OR Department




The Technical Director will administratively manage the
contract of the necessary Sun hardware and Sun software main-
tenance support. In the near term, the purchase of maintenance
services may be necessary while additional experience is gained
with the system. The primary concept for the future will be the
establishment of self insurance through the purchase of redundant
critical components to preclude costly maintenance services. The
NSA Department will provide reimbursement for a proportional
share of this cost, to be arranged by the Principal Investigator
and the Director of Wargaming. The NSA department will provide
all RSAS software support and unigue RSAS hardware reguirements
.
g. Individuals working on additional/new research grants and
reguiring RSAS support will be expected to contribute on a pro-
rated basis to RSAS costs. Additional details are as covered in
the RSAS standard operating procedures (SOP) contained in
Appendix A.
h. The NSA Department will make the RSAS available to the
WARLAB to be used in support of WARLAB war games, subject to the
coordination reguired through the RSAS Administrator and the
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Appendix D to RSAS Report
RSAS HARDWARE INSTALLATION AT THE
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL "
1. Current Installation , The current RSAS hardware inventory, as
of June 1989, consists of two Sun 3/60 micro workstations with a
color monitor and 16 megabytes of random access memory (RAM)
each, one Sun 3/180 file server with a black and white monitor
and 16 megabytes of RAM, a Fujitsu "Super Eagle" 575 megabyte
hard disk, a 1/2" high density 6250 bpi tape drive, a Textronics
color printer, a Sun (Apple) laser printer, plus cables, racks
and stands. The Sun workstations and the file server are being
linked together via ethernet. The large disk, the 1/2" tape
drive, and the file server are installed in a Sun rack in the
WARLAB equipment room, as are the printers, while the monitors
are located in the WARLAB working area. In addition, there is a
Tempested Zenith desktop computer in the NSA spaces in Root Hall
available for preparation of faculty and student RSAS related
studies and theses. As a matter of mutual interest, the WARLAB
has in its inventory two Sun 3/160 micro workstations with two 71
megabyte SCSI disks each.
2. Future Requirements .
a. Workstations and Hard Disks . The current Sun workstation
inventory allows use of the system by two analysts at any given
time, and permits basic scripted RSAS war games. The black and
white monitor that controls the file server can be used for
limited access only, especially when the server is under heavy
tasking. To make full use of the RSAS capabilities in the future,
one additional workstation is required. This will permit multiple
use for analytic purposes and the ability to play two sided war
games (one monitor each for Red, Blue, and Control/Green). To
provide for redundancy in case of hard disk failure, an addition-
al hard disk with 380 megabyte capacity has been ordered. This
disk will be removable to meet security requirements that have
developed since installation of the original RSAS at NPS. Another
380 megabyte disk is needed when funds are available to improve
the backup capability.
b. Large Screen Display . It has become increasingly apparent
that a large screen display device is essential to provide proper
presentations to classes, briefings, and seminars. It is prefer-
able that this large screen display be located in a secure class-
room due to overcrowding in the cramped spaces of the WARLAB, and
that the RSAS data be transmitted using fiber optics cables and a
Tempested workstation for security reasons. Currently, the dis-
play of RSAS data is limited to a maximum of four individuals
"huddled" around a workstation monitor.
c. WARLAB Power Upgrade . Additional equipment has been added
to the WARLAB, including the RSAS Sun installation, to the point
where the power supply into the secure space is not sufficient to
operate all of the equipment. Additional funding is needed to
prevent a sudden power outage which tends to destroy some of the
software if it is being manipulated under the UNIX operating
system.
d. New Building . The WARLAB spaces are becoming exceedingly
crowded and, as noted above, additional room is needed to mount a
large screen display and Tempested workstations for briefing and
classroom instruction. New power lines are required to prevent
power outages in the WARLAB. Moving the RSAS into a secure space
in the new Building "A" would provide for improved instruction
and utilization of the RSAS equipment, and would save the cost of
the power upgrade, the fiber optics cables, and the Tempested
workstation.
4. Maintenance Required . RSAS software maintenance will be pro-
vided by RAND and its subcontractor, CACI Products Company, as
arranged by the Director of Net Assessment in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD/NA) . Each RSAS "player" was required to
contribute $23K for FY-89 for this support, and will be required
to contribute about $30K for FY-90. Subsequent arrangements for
RSAS support will be the responsibility of the RSAS Principal
Investigator. With regard to the Sun workstations, it is intended
that the basic maintenance will be through redundant units in
order to lower the cost. Certain single items such as the large
hard disk may require some maintenance support with Sun Micro-
systems. There is currently no repair maintenance capability in
the WARLAB for the Sun ' s beyond what has been learned during
installation, i.e., NPS personnel can remove and replace boards,
and check basic DIP and backplane settings. There are several
repair alternatives, but the best seems to be the telephone type
of maintenance, in which phone consultations can be held with
Sun, and parts pulled and returned for replacement via mail.
Since Sun is relatively handy (Santa Clara and Milpitas), this
arrangement should not present any insurmountable problems, and
is much cheaper than on-site support (about half the price).
Unfortunately, due to the presence of classified information on
the hard disks, their maintenance cost is higher than normal. If
Sun workstations proliferate at NPS, closer support might be more
cost effective in the future.
5. Sun Software Support . Software support for the Sun work-
station is also required. The RSAS workstations must use the Sun
operating system release currently being used at RAND, and not
necessarily the latest Sun release. For example, the workstations
are currently using RSAS release 3.5 which is based upon Sun
release 3.5. The latest Sun release on the market is 4.0.1, and
4.1 is about to be issued. It is anticipated that RSAS 3.7 will
be released later this year based upon Sun release 4.0.1. Clear-
ly, not all Sun releases are required, so it appears that ad hoc
purchases, probably about once each year, are the best policy at
this time. RSAS users will need to follow RAND's lead and pur-
chase only those Sun releases that RAND implements. It is antici-
pated that multiple licensing arrangements will lower the cost of
operating the Sun workstations as they proliferate at NPS.
7. Summary of Programmed/Recommended Additions . In summary, the




* Backup hard disk $ 4,900
Power line installation (WARLAB) $ 12,500
Large screen display $ 21,000
Fiber optics cables $ 4,000
Longer term:
Sun hardware maintenance for
Super Eagle hard disk $ 400 (apprx
per mo)
Sun 3/60C-16 diskless worksta $ 12,500
Removable backup hard disk $ 3,500
Sun 3 tempested workstation $ 30,000
Software (essential):
* Sun O/S release $ 3,000 (apprx
per yr)
RAND/CACI support $ 30,000 (apprx
per yr)
* items currently on order.
8. Installation Summary . The current installation provides a
basic capability to conduct research and to run elementary war
games on the RSAS. The addition of the equipment already on order
or urgently needed will enhance the present installation, will
permit large-scale briefings and group instruction, provide for
more flexible use, and permit improved research and gaming. The
purchase of the long-term equipment will provide excellent flexi-
bility in research for both students and faculty, and will sup-
port the basis for the operation of highly sophisticated war
gaming. Secure space in the new Building "A" would provide much
improved working conditions and would preclude the need to fund
several expensive items required for proper RSAS utilization.
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